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Tests of the Betweenness Property of Expected Utility* 
CLYDE H. COOMBS AND LILY C. HUANC 
Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104 
In order that maximizing some kind of an expectation be acceptable as a descriptive 
theory of risky decision making it is necessary that a gamble made up of a probability 
mixture of two others lie between them in the perference order. It should not be the 
most preferred nor the least preferred of the three. The two experiments reported 
here test that condition and find it is significantly violated. According to Portfolio theory 
and expected risk theory the mixture may be most preferred but not least preferred. 
This condition is found to obtain. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The literature in decision theory is widely varied in source, intent, and content. It 
comes from economics, sociology, psychology, statistics, and mathematics (see for 
example, Lute and Raiffa, (1957), and Lee, (1971)), and from engineering and 
management sciences (see for example, Starr, 1969). The intent of some is normative, 
some descriptive, and some is action oriented (see for example, Dunn, (1972)). 
Throughout this literature a dominant role is played by the concept of maximizing 
expected utility1 so it never ceases to be probed both experimentally and theoretically 
and from both a normative and descriptive point of view. Because of the predominance 
of expected utility theory, the introduction of a notion of risk and risk-preference has 
not been as intensively pursued as it might have. Hence serious consideration of any 
alternative theory of decision making is best motivated by doubt thrown on maximizing 
expected utility. 
* This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant GB-15653 to the 
University of Michigan. We wish to thank Teri Berger and Robert Judson for assistance in the 
experiments and David H. Krantz, Steven Shevell, Paul Slavic, and J. E. Keith Smith for useful 
comments on the analysis and compositions, and Amos Tversky for substantial help and 
stimulating discussions. 
1 If X is an option with mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes (x1 ,..., xp ,..., x,) with 
associated probabilities (pl ,..., p, ,..., p”) and Us are real valued functions defined on the out- 
comes, then EU(X) = XI, pru&). If the outcomes are numbers, like points or money, then X 
is referred to as a gamble and only one utility function is involved. If the pa are not known in 
the sense of objective probabilities but instead correspond to the subjective likelihood of the 
occurrence of events, Ei , then A’(&) replaces p, and the theory is called maximizing subjective 
expected utility (SEU Theory). 
323 
Copyright 0 1976 by Academic Press, Inc. 
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 
324 COOMBS AND HUANG 
Here we examine a betweenness property of probability mixtures which is a necessary 
condition for the maximization of expected utility. We show that another theory of 
risky decision making, called Portfolio Theory, does not require this condition. Then 
we report two experiments which reveal significant violation of this property and hence 
the maximization of expected utility but not of Portfolio Theory. 
We will present the betweenness property for the case of two-outcome gambles as 
its generalization to n-outcome gambles is direct and uncomplicated. 
Let A be a gamble with outcomes a, and a2 with probabilities p and 1 - p respec- 
tively and C be a gamble with outcomes c1 and cg with probabilities q and 1 - q 
respectively. The expected utility of such a gamble as A is EU(A) = pU(a,) + 
(1 - p) ?Y(a,). Maximizing expected utility requires that 
Ag=C iff EU(A) > EU(C) 
where + is a binary preference relation and > is the natural order on the real numbers. 
A probability mixture of A and C, designated (A, t, C) means that A is played with 
probability t otherwise C. So (A, t, C) is a gamble with outcomes a, with probability 
pt, a2 with probability (1 - p)t, cr with probability q(1 - t), and c, with probability 
(1 - !I)(1 - t)* 
The expected utility of (A, t, C) is 
EU(A, t, C) = Pt U(a,) + (1 - P)t U(a,> + q(1 - t) WI) + (1 - n)(l - t> U(G), 
which reduces to 
EU(A, t, C) = t EU(A) + (1 - t) EU(C). 
It follows readily that 
EU(A) 3 EU(C) iff EU(A) 3 EU(A, t, C) > EU(C) 
and hence we have the following betweenness property introduced as an axiom by 
von Neumann and Morganstern (1953, p. 26, 3 : B : a and 3 : B : b): 
A>C iff A > (A, t, C) > C. 
Under expected utility theory, therefore, a probability mixture of two gambles lies 
between them in preference. That is, the mixture of two gambles cannot be preferred 
to both of them nor can both gambles be preferred to their mixture. The betweenness 
property is also a requirement of SEU Theory because subjective probabilities of 
complementary events must add to one and lie in the unit interval, so the tests and 
results reported here are equally relevant to both theories. 
If we let A and C designate two gambles with the same expected value and let B 
designate a probability mixture of them then only the preference orderings ABC and 
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CBA are admissible under expected utility theory. These two orderings will be called 
monotone orderings. The other four possible orderings violate EU Theory. These 
four are divided into two classes with two orderings in each, one of these classes is 
compatible with Portfolio Theory and the other is treated as reflecting an error rate 
in a manner to be described. 
Portfolio Theory (Coombs, 1969; Coombs & Huang, 1970), is a risk-preference 
theory but leaves the notion of risk undefined. The notion of risk is itself an object of 
theoretical and experimental research; see, for example, Huang (1971a,b), Pollatsek 
and Tversky (1970), and Coombs and Huang (1970). The details of Portfolio Theory 
are not important here except for the assumption it makes that if several gambles have 
the same expected value but differ in risk, then an individual has a single-peaked 
preference function2 over them. We add to this Huang’s result (Huang, 1971a,b; see 
also Coombs & Bowen, 1971) that risk satisfies the betweenness property for gambles 
which have the same expected value, i.e., the probability mixture of two gambles which 
differ in risk but have the same expected value will have an intermediate level of risk. 
From these two assumptions, that for two gambles with the same expected value 
a probability mixture of them has an intermediate level of risk and that an individual 
has a single-peaked preference function over risk, then it follows immediately that for 
some t E [0, l] he will prefer the probability mixture B = (A, t, C) over both com- 
ponent gambles A and C if one of them is more risky than his optimal level of risk 
and the other is less risky. So the two preference orderings BAC and BCA, which are 
violations of EU Theory, are compatible with Portfolio Theory and are called strictly 
folded orderings. The two monotone orderings, ABC and CBA, are compatible with 
Portfolio Theory also, as well as EU Theory. 
The remaining two logically possible orderings, ACB and CAB, are ones in which 
the gamble B, a probability mixture of A and C is the least preferred. These orderings 
could be described as resulting from a single-peaked avoidance function, an inverted 
preference function, so we will refer to them as inverted orderings. These inverted 
orderings violate EU Theory, Portfolio Theory, and, indeed, are inadmssible under any 
theory seriously proposed as a general theory of risky decision making. The frequency 
of occurrence of inverted orderings is used as an estimate of random error. 
The two experiments are direct tests of the betweenness property in that a pair of 
gambles with the same expected value but presumably differing in risk are used to 
construct a triple of gambles in which the third is a probability mixture of the other 
two. For example, if A were the gamble to toss for one dollar and C the gamble to 
toss for five dollars, we could construct a third gamble, B, by formin a 50/50 mixture 
of A and C which would have outcomes (-$5, -$l, $1, $5) each with probability 
one-fourth. According to Huang’s theory of expected risk, B would have a level of 
2 A single-peaked function over x may be defined as follows: if a > b > c with respect to an 
attribute .x such as risk, then a singIe-peaked preference function over x allows any permutation 
in which b > a or b > c where > is a binary preference relation. 
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risk intermediate between A and C and according to Portfolio Theory could be 
preferred to both of the others, a strictly folded preference ordering. Only the monotone 
preference orderings ABC and CBA are admissible under EU Theory. The inverted 
preference orderings, ACB and CAB will be used to evaluate the significance of the 
number of strictly folded orderings violating EU Theory. Strictly folded orderings are 
dual to inverted orderings and should therefore have the same rate of occurrence due 
to random error. 
The two experiments differ in the way in which preference orders on triples were 
obtained and in the way in which the gambles in a triple differed from each other. In 
the first experiment the subject rank orders each triple directly and the gambles 
differed in outcomes. In the second experiment the subject replicated pair comparison 
preferences and the gambles in a triple all had the same outcomes and differed only 
in their respective probabilities. 
2. EXPERIMENT I 
Subjects 
The subjects were 26 student volunteers paid for participation in the experiment. 
Stimuli 
The gambles used in the first session were of the form win x with probability p 
otherwise JJ, (x, p, JJ), and are presented in Table I. There are three sets of nine 
gambles each, the sets differing in expectation. Set I has gambles with E = -20~; 
Set II has gambles with E = 0; and Set III has gambles with E = 20~. The gambles in 
Sets I and III were constructed from those in Set II by subtracting or adding 20$, 
respectively, to all outcomes. One gamble not used in the analysis was added to each 
set of games (set in brackets in Table 1) to make a total of ten gambles so a balanced 
incomplete block design could be constructed for each set which provided 15 blocks of 
six gambles each which contain five replications on every pair. Over all three sets, then, 
there were 15 x 3 = 45 blocks of six gambles each. 
All gambles were represented by a picture of a spinner board without the spinner. 
The probabilities were represented by appropriate sections of the spinner board with 
winning and losing amounts indicated numerically. Two real spinner boards were 
constructed for practice purpose and real playing. 
Procedure 
Each subject participated in two sessions, one week apart. 
Session I: In the first session the subjects were first familiarized with the gambles by 
playing some for practice. They were told that they would be allowed to play one game 
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TABLE 1 
Gambles Used as Stimuli” in Experiment I 
Set1 E= -20~ 
$8.80 
$2.13 
$0.80 
$0.23 
- $0.09 
Set II E = 0 
$9.00 
$2.33 
$1.00 
$0.43 
$0.11 
Set111 E = +20$ 
$9.20 
$2.53 
$1.20 
$0.63 
$0.31 
0.1 
0.3 
0.5 
0.7 
0.9 
0.1 
0.3 
0.5 
0.7 
0.9 
0.1 
0.3 
0.5 
0.7 
0.9 
-91.20 
-81.20 
-$1.20 
-81.20 
-$1.20 
-$l.Oo 
-$l.oo 
-$l.Oo 
-$l.OO 
-$I.00 
- $0.80 
-$0.80 
-$0.80 
-$0.80 
-$0.80 
$0.80 0.9 -$9.20 
$0.80 0.7 -$2.53 
[$1.20 0.5 - $0.80] 
$0.80 0.3 -$0.63 
$0.80 0.1 -so.31 
$1.00 0.9 
$1.00 0.7 
[$0.80 0.5 
$1.00 0.3 
$1.00 0.1 
-$9.00 
- $2.33 
-$1.20] 
-960.43 
-30.11 
$1.20 0.9 
$1.20 0.7 
[$l.OO 0.5 
$1.20 0.3 
$1.20 0.1 
- $8.80 
-$2.13 
-$l.OO] 
- $0.23 
$0.09 
a The gambles in brackets were included to augment each set so n = 10 and provide a conve- 
nient bibd. They were not used in the analysis. 
for real at the end of the experiment and that the game would be selected by the 
experimenter on the basis of choices made by the subject during the experiment. 
The 45 blocks of stimuli were arranged in random order. A subject was given one 
block of stimuli at a time. He was asked to indicate his preference order on the six 
games as if he would have to play one of them once. There was a 15 minute break 
after the subject had ordered 15 blocks. 
Only Set III with E = 2Oe was used for the construction of the triples to be presented 
in the second sessions. The other two sets had been included in the first session for 
another purpose, to make some comparisons relevant to Portfolio Theory, and no 
further use of that data is reported here. 
Preparation for Session 2: Between Sessions 1 and 2 the data from the first session 
on Set III were analyzed for each individual and the triples constructed which were to 
to be used in the second session. Each individual’s data were used to construct a rank 
order of his preferences over the nine stimuli in Set III. This was done by counting the 
number of times each gamble was chosen over the others in the set and this total vote 
count yielded the rank order, the higher the total vote count for a gamble, the higher 
it was in the rank order. 
The rank ordered I scale obtained in this manner was then divided in half, alternately 
providing two sections, one consisting of the five odd numbered ones in the preference 
order and the other section consisting of the four even numbered games in the 
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preference order. A 50/50 probability mixture was then constructed for pairs of games 
in which one was from one section and one from the other.3 The design may be 
represented by a matrix of five rows and four columns with each of the 20 cells 
containing a 50/50 probability mixture of the corresponding row and column-the 
row and column gambles being two-outcome games and the mixture being a three or 
four-outcome game. So a triple of gambles consisted of a row gamble, a column gamble, 
and the corresponding cell gamble constructed from the mixture. The set of 20 triples 
was prepared for each subject separately because it depended on the rank order of the 
nine games in his I scale. An example of a triple for one subject is the following: 
A = ($2.53,0.3, -$0.80) 
c = ($1.20,0.1, $0.09) 
(A, l/2> cl = ($2.53,0.15; $1.20,0.05; $0.09,0.45; -$0.80,0.35). 
In this instance the gambles A and C differed in both amount to win and amount to 
lose so their mixture is a four-outcome gamble. 
Session 2: In the second session, each subject indicated his preference order for 
the three games in each triple under the instructions to assume he was to play one of 
the games once; only transitive response patterns were possible in this session. 
RESULTS 
Measures of Consistency and Intransitivity 
Every pair of stimuli in each set was replicated five times, so a subject’s choices on 
each pair were split either 5 - 0, 4 - 1, or 3 - 2. There are 36 pairs in each set so 
each subject’s average split on all three sets is reported in the first column of Table 2. 
The subjects are numbered and ordered in table from most to least consistent on the 
basis of this overall average. The subjects are also divided in two halves in the table, 
the more and the less consistent. 
If an individual were responding by chance to each pair with a choice probability 
of one-half, the expected value and standard deviation for the mean split on 108 pairs 
would be 3.44 and 0.059, respectively, so a mean split of 3.57 or more would indicate 
a significant degree (0.01 level) of non-random choice. The lowest overall level of 
consistency evinced by any subject exceeds this level substantially. 
Transitivity is a basic principle in the theories of choice under investigation here, 
EU Theory and Portfolio Theory, and this algebraic property is equivalent in proba- 
3 EU Theory and Portfolio Theory make differential predictions only if the component 
gambles of a mixture are bilateral to the ideal level of risk. With no assumption about the risk 
order, laterality is unknown. This method of selecting components to form mixtures, then, is 
arbitrary and perhaps no better than random choice would be. 
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TABLE 2 
Consistency and Intransitivity 
Consistency 
measure 
Intransitive 
triples 
1 4.89 0 
2 4.81 1 
3 4.84 0 
4 4.81 0 
5 4.79 0 
6 4.74 4 
I 4.71 0 
8 4.64 0 
9 4.62 1 
10 4.59 3 
11 4.58 3 
12 4.55 1 
13 4.55 0 
Subtotal 4.70 13 
14 4.54 0 
15 4.51 2 
16 4.38 1 
17 4.33 14 
18 4.33 1 
19 4.30 0 
20 4.27 11 
21 4.24 8 
22 4.21 6 
23 4.21 5 
24 4.20 5 
25 4.16 10 
26 4.16 11 
Subtotal 4.29 74 
Total 4.49 87 
bilistic terms to weak stochastic transitivity (Tversky, 1967). The total number of 
intransitive triples for each subject is reported in the second column of Table 2. For a 
diabolically intransitive subject, the maximum number of intransitive triples over the 
three sets of nine stimuli is 30 and the number expected by chance is 22. The maximum 
number for our subjects is 14 and the total over the 13 most consistent subjects is 13 
and over the 13 least consistent subjects is 74. The amount of intransitivity is insig- 
nificant and its relation to inconsistency supports the conclusion that such intransitivity 
as occurs is a consequence of inconsistency. 
480/13/3-7 
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Test of EC: Theory 
For each subject, the orderings of the 20 triples were classified as monotone, strictly 
folded, and inverted as defined above, and these three frequencies for each subject are 
reported in Table 3. The table is summarized by the two rows labelled Subtotal and 
the final row labelled Total. 
TABLE 3 
Classification of Response Patterns by S’s for Experiment I 
- 
Subject 
Satisfy EU theory 
& portfolio theory 
---~-. ~.~-- 
monotone orderings 
1 17 I 2 
2 16 0 4 
3 15 2 3 
4 13 4 3 
5 10 2 8 
6 12 6 2 
7 13 5 2 
8 13 4 3 
9 2 IO 8 
10 5 13 2 
11 14 0 6 
12 5 14 1 
13 7 12 1 
Subtotal 142 73 45 
14 8 9 
15 9 5 
16 12 4 
17 12 8 
18 J 6 
19 12 6 
20 11 8 
21 IO J 
22 13 2 
23 11 4 
24 9 5 
25 17 2 
26 10 0 
3 
6 
4 
0 
7 
2 
1 
3 
5 
5 
6 
Subtotal 141 66 
Total 283 139 
10 
53 
98 
Satisfy portfolio 
theory 
violate EU theory 
Strictly folded 
orderings 
Violate both 
theories 
Inverted orderings 
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Using the frequency, 98, of the inverted orderings as an estimate of the error rate, 
we find the frequency of strictly folded orderings, 139, significantly in excess, 
(xl2 = 7.08, p < 0.01). So the violations of EU Theory may be partitioned into one 
set (inverted orderings) which are unaccounted for except as random error, and 
another, significantly larger, set (strictly folded) which have a predicted regularity 
compatible with Portfolio Theory. The conclusion is further substantiated by the 
fact that it is more firmly supported by the more consistent subjects and is diluted but 
still true of the less consistent subjects. 
An analysis by subjects reveals that the excess of violations of EU Theory of the 
particular kind that is compatible with Portfolio Theory, is not uniformly distributed 
over subjects. Most of the disparity between strictly folded orderings and random 
violations of EU Theory is contributed by some six Ss (#lo, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20) as 
may be seen in Table 3. These Ss have a total of 64 strictly folded orderings and only 
8 random. This unequal distribution over Ss is to be expected because without a 
prior knowledge of the risk order and a Ss’ optimum level of risk there is no way to 
insure that the mixture for a particular subject will be constructed from gambles which 
bracket his optimum level of risk. In other words this is not a small effect accumulated 
over a lot of Ss but rather one that is of substantial magnitude in the context of 
alternatives appropriate to each S. 
3. EXPERIMENT II 
Subjects 
The subjects were 50 student volunteers paid for participation in the experiment. 
Stimuli 
The gambles used in this experiment were generated from a basic set of four gambles 
all of which had the same three outcomes, -$5,0, $5, but differed in their probabilities 
for the outcomes as indicated in Table 4 where gamble A, for example, is shown to 
have a probability of 0.9 that the outcome would be zero otherwise to win or lose $5 
was equally likely. It is a reasonable presumption that these gambles are ordered in 
risk in order from A to D. 
Note that gambles B and C can each be obtained as a contingent mixture in two 
different ways. The simplest example is C as a SO/SO mixture of B and D (C = 3 l/2 D), 
I.e., to play C once is identically equivalent in terms of final outcomes and their 
respective probabilities to tossing a fair coin to play eitherB or D and then playing B or 
D as the coin indicates. More completely, it is easily seen that 
B = A 215 C = A 417 D 
C = B1/2D = A2/7D. 
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TABLE 4 
The Basic Set of Gambles for Experiment II 
Outcomes 
-335 0 $5 
- ~.~ _-.. ~- -__-__ 
D 0.4 0.2 0.4 
c 0.3 0.4 0.3 
B 0.2 0.6 0.2 
A 0.05 0.9 0.05 
This set of four gambles was then used to generate four other sets by translating 
this basic set to expected value levels of $1, $2, $3, and $4 by adding the corresponding 
constant to all outcomes. For example the gamble C at expected value $3 has outcomes 
-$2, $3, $8 with probabilities 0.3, 0.4, 0.3 respectively, as before. 
So at each of five expected value levels, 0 to $4, we have a set of four gambles, and 
the members of each set all have the same outcomes and differ only in the probability 
distribution. 
Procedure 
The gambles in each set were presented pairwise on a slave scope. Each gamble was 
a circle with pie cuts to indicate the probabilities, and the outcomes indicated outside 
the circle next to its proper segment. Under the instructions that if he could play just 
one gamble once which would he choose, the subject indicated his preference by 
pushing a right or left button and then the computer erased the image. Then a sign 
saying “Push Black Button When Ready” appeared. When pushed it caused a new 
pair of gambles to appear. 
Each subject was run for one hour periods on three successive days. The first day 
began with an instructional and practice session including playing the spinner program 
on the computer and then he went through one replication of the 30 paired comparisons, 
six for each of the five expected value levels, in a mixed order. On each of the second 
and third days the subject went through two replications of the 30 paired comparisons 
in a different order and with a break between replications, providing a total of five 
replications on each pairwise choice. 
After each replication one game was played according to his choice on a pair. The 
pair of games was chosen with expected value conditional on whether he was ahead or 
behind from previous plays and to avoid excessive wins or losses. Once the pair of 
games was chosen by the experimenter it was displayed on the screen with a checkmark 
under the game the subject had indicated he preferred in that pair. It was then played 
on a homemade spinner wheel. The subject was paid at the end of the experiment an 
hourly wage of $2.00 plus his winnings and losses over the five replications. 
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RESULTS 
Measure of Consistemy 
A measure of consistency was constructed for each subject as an average over the 
30 pars of the 5-0, 4-1, or 3-2 splits exactly as in Experiment 1. The results were 
reported in Table 5 with the 5’s numbered and ordered from most to least consistent. 
The 0.05 level of significant consistency is 3.65 and the 0.01 level is 3.74. With an 
additional number of replications there is a potential problem about detecting true 
indifference. An even number of replications would, correspondingly, create a potential 
problem by obscuring a true preference. The level of consistency revealed in Table 5 
suggests that the former is the lesser evil. Three additional Ss with consistency 
measures of 3.60, 3.43, and 3.13 respectively were dropped on the grounds that their 
choices were not distinguishable from random behavior. The asterisks in Table 5 
indicate Ss who had monotone preference orderings everywhere as discussed below. 
Construction and ChsiJication of Preference Orderings 
The stochastically dominant choice on each pair if is transitive over the six pairs 
at each expected value level yields a rank ordered I scale. There were 22 of the 50 Ss 
for whom the preference order was transitive at all five expected value levels and the 
preference order was monotone everywhere, i.e., every I scale was either ABCD or 
DCBA. These 22 Ss who were monotone everywhere satisfy EU Theory perfectly in 
so far as the gambles used in this experiment are concerned. If the gambles are pre- 
sumed to increase in risk from A to D then 15 of the 22 were risk aversive at all 
expected value levels, four were risk loving and three were risk averse at lower expected 
value levels and then changed to the other extreme at one of the higher expected value 
levels and stayed there. 
The 28 Ss who were not monotone everywhere would, of course, have one or more 
triples with a nonmonotone preference pattern and the classification of these triples is 
of particular interest. In Experiment I, the subject ordered each triple directly so the 
variety of orderings for the triple A, B, C for example, were classified as monotone 
(ABC, CBA), strictly folded (BAG’, BCA), and inverted (ACB, CAB), for the reasons 
previously given. In Experiment II, in which the ordering on a triple is constructed 
from the dominant pairwise choices, a subject could yield, in addition to these three 
kinds of transitive orderings, either of two intransitive patterns, A --f B --f C -+ A, 
C+B-+A+C. 
So for every triple there are two possible response patterns for each of four kinds: 
monotone, strictly folded, inverted, and intransitive. Only the first, monotone, is 
compatible with EU Theory, the other three are all violations. If EU Theory is valid 
then the three kinds of violations should occur with equal frequency. To test this 
assumption for strictly folded and inverted orderings we note that if the true ordering 
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TABLE 5 
Consistency Measures 
S# 
1* 5.00 26 4.46 
2* 4.96 27* 4.33 
3* 4.96 28 4.33 
4* 4.96 29’ 4.33 
5* 4.93 30 4.30 
6* 4.93 31 4.26 
7* 4.90 32 4.26 
8* 4.90 33 4.23 
9* 4.87 34 4.23 
10* 4.87 35* 4.17 
11* 4.83 36 4.17 
12* 4.83 37 4.10 
13* 4.80 38 4.10 
14 4.77 39 4.06 
Is* 4.73 40 4.06 
16’ 4.73 41 4.03 
17* 4.67 42 4.00 
18* 4.67 43 3.97 
19 4.63 44 3.97 
20 4.63 45 3.97 
21* 4.57 46 3.93 
22 4.57 47 3.93 
23 4.57 48” 3.93 
24 4.53 49 3.93 
25 4.46 50 3.73 
Consistency 
measure S# 
C9nsistency 
measure 
* Indicates those Ss who had monotone preference orderings at all five expected value levels. 
ordering is ABC, then, if an error is made on the embedded pair AB, the resulting 
order will be BAC and will be strictly folded. If an error is made on the embedded 
pair BC, the resulting order will be ACB and will be classified as inverted. To test the 
assumption that these two kinds of errors are equally likely, we examined the incon- 
sistency of the 22 monotone Ss on all such pairs in every monotone triple, of which 
there were 440. The mean consistency level for 5 replications on the first embedded 
pair, such as AB in the triple ABC, is 4.680 and the mean consistency level on the 
second embedded pair, which is BC in that triple, was 4.718, not a significant difference. 
Under Portfolio Theory the strictly folded orderings are also admissible and with a 
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suitably designed experiment may be encouraged, so only the inverted and intransitive 
response patterns should still occur with equal frequency but significantly less than 
those which are strictly folded. 
As a further control these 28 Ss are divided into the 14 most consistent and the 
14 least consistent. The results for each level of expected value are presented in 
Table 6 with the crucial subtotals at the bottom of the table. We find, overall, that there 
are 85 strictly folded orderings, violating EU Theory, which is over three times as 
many as expected on the basis of random error. We also see that the number of 
transitive orderings classified as inverted is the same as the number of intransitive 
patterns, as expected, and supports the contention that they represent random error. 
TABLE 6 
Classification of Response Patterns for Experiment II 
Satisfy EU 
Theory and 
Portfolio 
'Iheory 
I 
Monotone 
Orderings 
Total 
8.3 
aa 
aa 
88 
aa 
36 
54 
50 
46 
35 
44 
43 
3s 
39 
40 
221 
201 
862 
Satisfy Port- Violate 
folio Theory. both 
Violate EU Theories 
Theory 
Folded Inverted Patterns 
Orderings Transitive Intransitive 
Orderings Patterns 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
12 3 5 
2 0 0 
5 0 1 
a 0 2 
12 8 1 
7 2 3 
11 1 1 
14 4 3 
a 4 5 
6 4 6 
39 11 9 
46 15 18 
a5 26 27 loo0 
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4. DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
The absolute number of violations reported in Table 6 are not in themselves 
significant because they are dependent upon the particular S’s selected, the range of 
gambles used at a fixed E level, the range of E levels used, and the particular probability 
mixtures used in constructing triples. This experiment, however, is representative in 
these respects of many of the experiments that have been reported studying risky 
decision making and is suggestive of one of the reasons for the viability of EU Theory. 
Overall 862 out of 1,000 response patterns on triples of gambles, 86.2 %, are compatible 
with EU Theory and there are not many behavioral theories that do as well. Portfolio 
Theory would raise this another 8.5 % to 94.7 %, and the rest, 5.3 %, is random error, 
as far as this experiment is concerned. The point that needs to be made is that if a 
theory is wrong in principle it will inevitably be wrong in some application no matter 
how useful it may be as an approximation pragmatically. 
I f  expected utility theory is rejected as descriptive theory it means that no theory or 
procedure for measuring utility may exist which will justify maximizing expected 
utility as a theory of individual decision making under risk. A more complicated theory 
would have to be invented in which EU Theory was supplemented with something to 
account for experimental data, such as, for example, a risk preference. Tversky (1967) 
provided evidence that in comparing risky and riskless choices, a risk premium was 
needed to account for the risky choices with expected utilities based on the riskless 
choices, which, incidentally, was a positive increment, but his subjects were inmates 
of a prison. 
The results indicate that the available procedures for measuring utilities (e.g., 
von Neumann & Morganstern, 1953; Savage, 1954; Davidson, Suppes, & Siegel, 1957; 
or Coombs & Komorita, 1958) cannot be safely employed since their assumptions are 
not satisfied by the subjects. There are systematic violations of EU Theory which can 
be accounted for by a more general theory. Expected utility theory can, of course, be 
used normatively to guide the individual in his choices. 
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